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The Impact of Democratic Party Reform on the South
B. DENHARDT
University of Kansas
ROBERT

and
JAYE.

HAKES

University of New Orleans
Following its traumatic 1968 national convention, the Democratic party
undertook a thorough revision of its guidelines for delegate selection. The
now-familiar McGovern-Fraser reforms sought increased involvement of all
elements of the party in the delegate selection process by requiring timeliness, openness, and non-discrimination. In 1968 many convention delegates
had been chosen by processes beginning well before the presidential candidates had even announced their intentions. To discourage this practice , the
timeliness doctrine required that delegate selection take place entirely within
the calendar year of the convention . The guidelines also mandated an open
process in which all party members had an opportunity to participate . This
policy contrasted with earlier procedures in which party officials and officeholders dominated the entire process; for example , in Georgia and Louisiana,
the governors hand-picked the delegates. The commitment to nondiscrimination was intended to provide representation for groups traditionally
under-represented by requiring that blacks , women , and youth be included
among the delegates in numbers that "bear a reasonable relationship to the
group's presence in the population." 1
1The

new rules required that state parties :
l. Adopt explicit written party rules governing delegate selection .
2. Adopt procedural rules and safeguards for the delegate selection process that would : a.
forbid proxy voting; b. forbid the use of the unit rule and related practices like instructing
delegations; c. require a quorum of not less than 40% at all party committee meetings ; d . remove
all mandatory assessments of delegates to the national convention; e. limit mandatory participation fees to no more than $10 and petition requirements to no more than l % of the standard used
to measure Democratic strength ; f. ensure that in all but rural areas , party meetings are held on
uniform dates , at uniform times , and in public places of easy access; g. ensure adequate public
notice of all party meetings involved in the delegate selection process .
3. Seek as broad a base of support for the party as possible in the following manner : a. add to
the party rules and implement the six anti-racial-discrimination standards adopted by the Democratic national committee; b . overcome the effects of past discrimination by affirmative steps to
encourage representation on the national convention delegation of minority groups , young
people and women in reasonable relationship to their presence in the population of the state; c.
allow and encourage any Democrat of 18 years of age or older to participate in all party affairs.
4. Make, where applicable , the following changes in the delegate selection process : a.
select alternates in the same manner as prescribed for the selection of delegates ; b. prohibit the
ex-officio designation of delegates to the national convention ; c. conduct the entire process of
delegate selection in a timely manner, i.e ., within the calendar year of the convention ; d . in
convention systems, select no less than 75% of the total delegation at a leve l no higher than the
congressional district and adopt an apportionment formula which is based on population and/or
some standard measure of Democratic strength ; e. apportion all delegates to the national
convention not selected at large on a basis of representation which gives equal weight to
population and Democratic voting strength based on the previous presidential election ; f.
designate the procedures by which slates are prepared and challenged ; g. select no more than
10% of the delegation by the state committee .
See Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, Mandat e for Reform
(Washington, D. C. : Democratic National Committee , 1970). By the time of implementation, a
few of the original guidelines were modified .
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While the hope of the party was that these reforms would help alleviate the
turmoil of the 1968 convention , the reforms themselves became a matter of
serious controversy. Those who were less successful in gaining delegate votes
in 1972 complained that the reforms hurt their campaigns , and even those who
were successful argued that the reforms hurt their effort in the general
election. This latter argument was reflected in a recent exchange in the
American Political Scienc e Review in which William Cavala claimed that " . ..
in 1972, those rules and the dynamics of politics combined to produce a
delegation which did not represent in either a symbolic or descriptive fashion
the majority of those who have supported the Democratic party in the past. " 2
However , as Austin Ranney , a member of the reform commission , pointed
out , "The prime objective ... was not to make the party more combat-ready
for November , but rather to ensure a more repr esentativ e . . . convention. " 3
The 1972 delegate selection experience provides an excellent opportunity
for political scientists to comment on an important area of public policy .
However , more broadly , this experience can be helpful in increasing our
understanding of political parties and especially the dynamics of change
within parties. In this article , we will focus on the compliance structure of
parties as complex organizations ; we will seek to demonstrate several ways in
which local and state party organizations complied with the reform rules . We
will examine the delegate selection process in the South (the area where
compliance was supposed to be most difficult ) and, then, using the delegate
selection process in one state , we.will analyze the state party - national party
compliance relationship and the dynamics of politics at the local level.
American political parties have been widely viewed as organizations in
which compliance has been minimal. Parties have been seen as loose coalitions of independent parties , in part because of the limited number of sanctions that the national party can apply to state and local unit. V. 0. Key said :
"Viewed over the entire nation , the party organization constitutes no disciplined army. It consists rather of many state and local points of power, each
with its own concerns with state and local nominations and elections ." 4 Thus ,
state parties might be expected to resist following rules , such as the
McGovern-Fraser reforms , established by the national party . The weakness of
national political parties in America stems , in part , from their lack of what
Etzioni called "utilitarian assets ", which are based on the ability to manipulate
economic resources , including goods and services , wages , salaries , man2William Cavala , "Changing th e Rules Chang e s th e Cam e: Part y Reform and th e 1972
California Delegation to th e De mocratic National Conv e ntion ," Am erican Political Science
Rev iew , 68 (March 1974), 42.
3 Austin Rann ey, "Comment on Chan ging th e Rules Ch anges the Came," Am erican Political
Science Review, 68 (March 1974), 44.
4 V. O. Key, Jr ., Politics, Parties, & Pressure Grou.p s, 5th ed. , (New York: Thoma s Crow ell
Compan y, 1964), p . 328. See also Austin Rann ey, The Doctrin e of Respon sible Party Gove rnm ent
(Urbana : University of Illinoi s Pr ess, 1954), and Corn e lius P. Potter and Bern ard D. He nnessy,
Politics With out Power: The National Party Committ ees (New York: Athe rton Press, 1964).
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power , and technical and administrative capabilities, etc. National parties
have relied , instead , on "persuasive assets ," which include the manipulation
of symbols, rituals , or other such rewards and derivations often through the
use of mass media , and the allocation of acceptance and positive response. 5
The adoption of McGovern-Fraser guidelines indicated a desire on the part of
th e Democrats to promote compliance through both kinds of assets.
REFORMING SOUTHERN SELECTION PROCESSES
In April , 1970, the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection
(McGovern-Fraser Commission ) filed its official report , Mandat e for Reform ,
with the Democratic National Committee . The Commission issued 18
"guidelines " concerning the selection of delegates to the 1972 Democratic
National Convention. Although three of the guidelines were only recommendations , the Commission stated that it regarded 15 "as binding on the states ."
The rules were to be enforced at the Convention by th e Cr edentials Committee, which would refuse to seat state delegations that refused to follow the
guidelines. The stringency of the new requir e ments was indicated by the fact
that every state was in violation of at least six of them.
The issuance of the report raised the issue of the extent to which state
parti es would comply with the norms of the national party . Besides the
probl ems of any state parties adhering to national dir ec tives discussed above ,
there were special reasons to expect that compliance would be difficult in the
South. Since the New Deal , Southern Democrats have frequently been at
odds with the leadership of the national Democratic party . Noting the failure
of South e rn Democrats to be fully integrated into the national party , Key in
1949 remarked : " In national politics , ... the party ... is, or at least has been ,
th e instrument for the conduct of the 'foreign relations ' of the South with the
rest of the nation ." 6 Although the South changed in many ways in the next two
deca des , the authors of The Changing Politics of th e South characterized at
least four of the Southern states (Alabama , Mississippi , Louisiana , and South
Carolina ) primarily in terms of protest and resistance to national norms . 7
Not surprisingly, there was some initial resistance to the concept of party
5 Amitai Etzioni , The ActiDe Society : A Theory of Societal and Political Processes (New York:
The Free Press, 1968). Th ese concept s were deve loped ea rlier in somewhat different te rm s in A
Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: The Fr ee Pr ess, 1961).
6 V. 0 . Key, Jr ., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p.
315. Key says in Politics, Parti es, & Pressure Group s (p . 332) that " ... th e difficulti es of th e
Democra tic nation al organization with some of its southern stat e subsidiari es cannot be cope d
with by admini strativ e sanctions . Th ey are symptom atic of th e existence in th e party of an
irreco ncilabl e element rather than of defects of organizational arrangements."
7 William C. Havard , ed ., Th e C han ging Politics of the South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana Stat e
University Press, 1972). For an overview of th e role of th e South in th e Democ ratic party , see
Donald S. Stron g, "Fu rth er Reflection s on Southern Politi cs," Journal of Politics, 33 (May 1971),
239-56, and Allen P. Sindler , ed ., Change in the ContemporanJ South (Durham , N.C.: Duke
University Press, 1963).
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reforms from the South . The four major credentials fights at th e 1968 Demo cratic convention concerned Southern states (Mississippi , Texas , Georgia ,
and Alabama ), and there was some feeling that Southern states might be the
"target" of written standards for delegate se lection . While the 1968 convention wa~ mandating party reform by a 1,350-1,206 approval of the minority
report of the Rules Committee, del egates from Southern states were opposing
the proposal by a margin of more than four to one . To some extent , the new
guidelines did affect delegation selection more in Southern states than
elsewhere. As seen in Table 1, the 1968 plans of Southern stat es had somewhat
more violations of the new requirements than those of other states, although
the need for change was extensive everywhere.
To effect the mandated reforms , state parties followed the common pattern
of (1) establishing study commissions to suggest particular plans in compliance
with the guidelines , (2) adopting such plans , and (3) if necessary , asking state
legislatures to make appropriate changes in state laws. These steps produced
extensive changes in the rules for delegate selection in Southern states .
Whereas no Southern states used presidential preference primaries in 1968,
Florida , North Carolina , and Tennesse e did so in 1972. Louisiana and Georgia
used committees dominated by Democratic governors to pick delegates in
1968, but no state attempted to use such closed procedures in 1972. Although
th e predominate method of selecting delegates in the South remained , as it
was in 1968, the convention system, all eleven states made extensive efforts to
conform with the guidelines . According to the reform commission itself ,
Alabama and North Carolina achieved full compliance in 1970; Mississippi ,
Tennessee, and Virginia met the requirements in 1971; and Arkansas ,
Louisiana , South Carolina , and Texas did so in 1972. At the opening of the
1972 national convention , Florida and Georgia were judged to be in "substantial compliance," meaning they had made most of the required changes, but
were still deficient in one area. Thus , by 1972 the written plans of the
Southern state parties had , with only minor exceptions, come into compliance
with the national requirements and had done so at a rate quite similar to those
of other states. (See Table 2.)
Political scientists do not need to be reminded that there may be important
differences between written plans for delegate selection and formal compliance on the one hand and the actual process of selecting delegates and
operational compliance on the other. Judgments on the process of selecting
delegates were rendered by the Credentials Committee and ultimately the
convention as a whole. Although political strategems played a part in the
deliberations of the Credentials Committee , its manifest function was to
determine whether delegates had been elected according to the rules of the
national party and whether the various delegations were representative.
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Many of its deci sions were based on field reports from its staff of 34 hearing
officers .8
The Credentials Committe heard challenges to all of the Southern delegations , except that from Arkansas . Challenges in the South accounted for 10 of
the 26 disputed states considered by th e committee. The large number of
Southern challenges is difficult to explain, however , since the bulk of them
were denied by the committee. Only in Georgia were extensive adjustments
in the delegation required. In Louisiana and Virginia , changes involving only
a few votes were made . The delegations of the eight other Southern states
wer e accepted in toto. The convention delegates upheld all of the judgments
of the Credentials Committee , except they reversed its unseating of 151
California delegates pledged to George McGovern .
The results of action by the Credentials Committee and on the floor of the
convention are tabulated in Tabl e 3. As can be seen , a high percentage of
delegations and delegates were accepted by the Credentials Committee and
the convention , indicating a high rate of compliance with national guidelines
by state parties in the process of delegate selection. In addition , the rate of
acceptance of Southern delegations and delegates was similar to that for the
rest of the nation , indicating that there was no special resistance to national
norms in Southern state parties .
While the reforms were directed toward changing procedures , they were
also substantively concerned with the representation of previously underrepresented groups (demographic representation ) and the responsiveness of
the resulting delegations to the wishes of the Democratic electorate (preferential representation ). The first of these concerns is particularly appropriate to
study in the context of Southern politics , since the failure of earlier Southern
delegations to include significant representation of blacks was in large measure responsible for the consideration of this issue by the reform commission.
The second issue - the responsiveness of the resulting delegation - is of
special interest in the South since it was her e that the resulting delegations
seemed to deviate most markedly from the anticipated political preferences of
the voters .
Demographi c Repres entation
The changes in the rules governing delegate selection which required that
blacks , women , and young people be represented among the delegates in
proportions that "bear a reasonable relationship to the group 's presence in the
population " were largely brought about in response to the previous transgressions of Southern states. For years, black voters in the South - a group
probably providing the majority of those supporting Democratic presidential
candidates - were systematicaJly denied access to the delegate selection
8
Of the People: Report of the Credentials Committee to the 1972 Democratic Nat ional
Convention {Washington , D.C .: Democ ratic National Committee , 1972).

THE IMPACT OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY REFORM ON THE SOUTH

41

process and, as a result, were not represented on the delegations finally
chosen . Where the formation of delegate slates or the direct selection of
delegates rested solely with white (often blatantly racist) politicians, there was
little hope or expectation that there would be black delegates to the national
convention .
At the 1964 convention, the Democratic party endorsed a strong platform
position in support of civil rights legislation; however, at that same convention , there were a total of only four black delegates from all the Southern states
combined. Some progress was made between 1964 and 1968, and all the
Southern states had black delegates in 1968. Only one state, however , had as
many as ten blacks on its delegation. None had a percentage ofblack representation which would approximate the percentage of the state's voters who were
black. However limited this progress, it is important to note that stronger
black representation was obtained in 1968 without the imposition of quotas.
The strength of the civil rights movement and the diffusion of this national
norm through the South was enough to bring about some changes.
The 1972 delegations from the South did have significant black representation (see Table 4). All the Southern states but one (Texas) had delegations with
black representation exceeding the percentage of black voters in the state.
Although the dominant concern in the South was with racial balance, women
and young people also increased their representation in 1972. Female representation in Southern delegations went from 13% in 1968 to 36% in 1972
(see Table 5), while the number of young delegates also jumped substantially.
The obvious question is whether the increases in the delegate strength of
blacks, women, and young people were caused by the implementation of the
new rules on delegate selection, specifically quotas, or whether they were the
result of changing political norms of a more diffuse sort.

Preferential Representation
The increase in the number of blacks on the Southern delegations to the
1972 convention -as striking as it was -was equalled in terms of surprise by
the liberal leaning of many Southern delegations. While support for the
candidacy of George Wallace was obviously high in the South in 1972, George
McGovern received a substantial number of delegate votes from the South.
Specifically , at the convention, of those delegates from the South voting for
either Wallace or McGovern, McGovern received well over a third of the
votes. In fact, in three states, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi, McGovern
received more delegate votes than Wallace. This occured in spite of the fact
that many black delegates from the South, who might have been expected to
add to the McGovern vote, supported the candidacy of Shirly Chisholm.
The question of whether Southern delegations were reflective of the
political preferences of Southern Democrats rests on one's definition of

42

JO URNAL OF POLITI CAL S CIENCE

"Democrats. " In the South , it is helpful to distinguish between "local Democrats" and "national Democgats. " Local D e mocrat s constitute th e great bulk
of the population , as can be seen in reg istration figur es and election res ults for
state and local offices. Party identification surveys and results in national
elections indicate that national Democrats have dec rease d in numb e r in
recent decades , include only a minority of South ern voters, and are larg ely
black. 9
In primary states, where larg e numbers of voters participat ed, th e results
of delegate selection reflect ed th e pr efe renc es of local as well as national
Democrats. In the three South e rn states holding pr esidential pr efe re nce
primaries in 1972, George Wallace rece ived 73% of th e delegates, while
George McGovern received only 5%. In convention states , however , local
Democrats we re not motivated to participat e, leav ing decision-making to th e
national Democrats . The national De mocrats in the South were thos e intens ely interested in the outcom e of delegat e selection and most acquainted
with the fact that the rules had changed. In th e convention states, McGovern
received 32% of the delegates , compared to Wallac e's 25%. Although organizational inputs affected greatly th ese variations in candidate str engths , th e
differenc es betw ee n the re sults of primary and non -primary stat es see m to
indicat e that changing the rul es changed the play e rs. From whatever system
they were selected in 1972, th e de lega tes were reflec tive of the pr efe rences of
those who identified with and participated in those particul ar systems. In
some cases, they represented local Democrats ; in other cases, national Democrats.
On the whole , th e re was a high level of compliance by Southern state
parties in 1972 with the guidelines of the McGov e rn-Fraser Commission.
Such compliance is indicated by the adoption of new rul es for del ega te
selection and the representative character of the delegations , particularl y as
measured by demographic variables. Gvien th e tradition al view of th e rul emaking power of national parti es and of Southern politics , thi s finding is
significant. This macroscopic view , howeve r, does not help us to disce rn very
well the reasons for compliance or the political dynamics of delega te selec tion .
THE CASE OF LOUISIANA 10
Very littl e detailed information exist s on delega te selection in th e South ern states. This gap in the literatur e of political science is part icu larl y acute for
9 Havard (ed. ), Changing Politics of the South , p. 728; and Everett Ladd , Jr ., Charles
Hadley, and Lauriston King, "A New Political Realignm ent ?" Public Int erest, No. 23 (Sprin g
1971). 57-58.
1
°1'he study of Louisiana is based in part on th e participant-observer method . Both aut hors
worked in the McGovern campaig n in Louisiana : one was a McGovern delegate to the national
conve ntion . Both during and after th e process of delegate selection, th e auth ors had numerous
occasions to discuss the events at lengt h with participants from various camps. To .test our
observations, a questionnaire was mailed to th e 40 delegates elec ted at congress ional district
conventions. Since th e questionnaires were not sent until 1974, th e response of 11 was not
surpri sing. Althou gh the delegates returning questionnaires were a good cross sectio n in terms of
geogra ph y and pr eside ntial preference , th eir percepti ons of the selec tion process did not vary
grea tly among th emse lves, now did th ey differ grea tly from those of the auth ors.
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the convention states, for convention states in the South, as those elsewhere,
have been virtually ignored by journalists, practitioners writing memoirs, and
political scientists. 11 For this reason, case studies in particular states are
necessary for analysis of the impact of national party rules.

Adopting the Rules
Louisiana was one of the states where resistance to national party
guidelines might have been expected to occur. The state's previous methods
of selecting delegates to national conventions were in direct violation of some
of the reform commission's most important requirements. 12 Delegates had
previously been picked by the Govegnor rather than chosen in any kind of
open process, and blacks, who comprised approximately 30% of Louisiana's
population, were grossly underrepresented
in previous delegations. 13
Moreover, an acceptable plan had to be produced by a Democratic State
Central Committee that had long been reluctant to cooperate with the national party. In 1948 the Democratic Committee almost kept the name of
Harry Truman off the ballot in Louisiana. Although politics in Louisiana
changed greatly in the next two decades, the actions of the State Central
Committee in 1968 ousting the loyalist national committeeman and denying
the Democratic presidential candidate the rooster, traditional emblem of the
party in Louisiana, suggested that the committee was still in a state of
semi-rebellion against the national party. 14 Moreover, the membership of the
Democratic committe had been .elected in 1971 from districts that favored
small rural parishes, that included a number of multi-member districts and
that had been declared unconstitutional for 1971 legislative elections. 15 Only
three of the committee's 117 members were black.
The Democratic Committee did not rush to adopt a plan satisfying national
party requirements; the 13-person study committee, which included one
black and one woman, that was supposed to develop Louisiana's plan was not
selected until December of 1971. The study committee adopted a "twotiered" plan of delegate selection. The process of selection was to begin with
party caucuses open to all registered Democrats in the state's 105 legislative
representative districts. These 105 caucuses elected delegates (15 from each
caucus) to eight congressional district conventions, which in turn selected 40
of the 44 delegates to the national convention. Four delegates were elected at
11 Robert B. Denhardt
and Jay E. Hakes , "Delegate Selection in on-Primary States ,"
National Civic Review , 63 (November 1974), 521.
12 For a description of delegate selection in 1968, see Ted Martin , "The Democratic Party of
Louisiana and the Selection of Delegates to the 1968 National Convention ", (Mimeo prepared by
the New Orleans Coalition, 1969).
13 o blacks were included in Louisiana 's 1964 delegation. In 1968 the delegation contained 9
blacks (out of a total of 52) with 5½ votes (out of 36).
14 Perry H. Howard , "Louisiana: Resistance and Change ," in Havard (ed. ), Changing Politics
of the South , pp. 574-82.
15 Stanley A. Halpin , Jr ., and Richard L. Engstrom , "Racial Gerrymandering and Southern
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large. 16 After the study committee made several adjustments in its plan
requested by the national Democratic headquarters, the full State Committee
on February 19 approved the two-tier plan, bringing Louisiana into full
compliance with the requirements established by the Reform Commission.
The State Committee chose to work within the guidelines of the national
party, since to do otherwise could well have meant that the Louisiana delegation would not be seated at Miami.
The Democratic State Central Committee later printed and distributed in
official plan for delegate selection and selected chairmen and sites for the
representative and congressional district caucuses to be held on April 15 and
May 13.

The Issue of Representation
The adoption of new party rules, while meeting the formal requirements of
the Reform Commission, in no way guaranteed that a "representative" delegation would be selected, nor did it answer the question of what a representative
delegation should look like. The official plan pointed out that blacks in
Louisiana comprised about 30% of the population, females at least 50%, and
young people between the ages of 18 and 30 about 20% and recommended
that "every effort be made to select delegates truly representative of all
Democrats of Louisiana in the respective caucuses and congressional district
conventions including youth , women, blacks and other ethnic minorities. 17
But blacks were skeptical that the new system would produce sizeable increases in representation for them. To comply with national requirements,
the selection plan banned winner-take-all provisions at the state level, but not
at the representative district or congressional districts levels. Since blacks did
not approach a majority in any congressional district and since previous
Louisiana elections demonstrated a reluctance on the part of whites to vote for
black candidates, it was not unreasonable to expect that the Louisiana delegation would continue to include few, if any, blacks. An ad hoc, but effective
state-wide organization of blacks known informally as "the black challenge,"
planned initially to run an alternative system of delegate selection and present
its case for seating at the Miami Convention to the credentials committee. 18
State Legislative Redistricting ," Journal of Public Law , 22, No. 1 {1973), 52-57.
16The new rules also reguired , inter alia, that (1) the caucuses and conventions be widely
publicized , (2) the call should stress that the invitation extended to "all Democratic voters of any
color , creed , sex, and age , young and old ," (3) those who wished to run as candidates in the
caucuses or conventions had to submit written notification along with 6ve dollars to the respective
chairman at least five days prior to the meetings , (4) candidates at local caucuses would be allowed
to speak in their own behalf , (5) voting would be by secret ballot, and (6) a majority of votes cast
was necessary for election at all levels. See Democratic State Central Committee of Louisiana ,
"Official Plan for Delegate Selection to the 1972 Democratic National Convention."
17 lbid. , p . 6.
18 The "black challenge " was organized by a black New Orleans attorney, who maintained
communications with the Center for Democratic Reform in Washington , D .C ., as well as with
black political leaders throughout Louisiana .
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The group participated in what it considered a defective plan (i.e. the plan
adopted by the State Central Committee), in part because it viewed this step
as a necessary prerequisite for a successful challenge.
The question of black representation continued to be an important issue
throughout the delegate selection process. Few people connected with the
selection process denied that blacks should receive some representation. The
Reform Commission's guidelines seemed to require that blacks constitute
about 30% of the state's delegation, since that was their portion of the state's
population. Members of the "black challenge" argued that blacks were entitled to 50% of the delegation because of their heavy support of previous
Democratic candidates for president. 19 Many people in the McGovern organization accepted the black challenge' s view of racial balance, but many
others in the state viewed the demand as unreasonable.
Although racial balance was the dominant issue concerning representation, other aspects of the problem were not ignored. The Women's Political
Caucus publicly demanded equal representation for women and organized
orientation sessions for potential female participants in several areas of the
state. Young people did not organize as a group, although many were active in
the process and argued as individuals that they should be included in the
delegation because of their age.
Participation
Exact figures on participation in Louisiana's first step in delegate selection,
the 105 representative district caucuses, were not kept. Attendance at the
local meetings varied from about 20 to 1000 people. Although the meetings
were open to all registered Democrats, less than one percent of those eligible
attended their caucus. Each district was to elect 15 delegates to the congressional district caucuses, but in some areas less than 15 people filed the
necessary papers to run, although doing so was quite easy. One reason for low
attendance was undoubtedly the low visibility of the new system. The caucuses did receive some publicity, but nothing like the political advertising that
might go into a local campaign for a judgeship. In addition, the system was
new and unfamiliar to voters. Another reason for low attendance may have
been the length of the meetings, as compared with the time needed to simply
cast a vote. At least one stormy caucus lasted 10 hours. 20
1 9The delegate strength of individual states at the national convention was determined by
population and by Democratic vote in the previous presidential election. Since blacks had cast
over 70% of the votes in Louisiana for Hubert Humphrey in 1968, the demand by blacks for 50%
representation was an approximation of the average of these two factors.
2
°1'wo factors contributed to the length of the caucuses. First , candidates were allowed to
give speeches. With the number of candidates ranging as high as 43, this part of the meetings
consumed considerable time. Second, where many candidates were running , run off ballots were
usually necessary . Since efficient methods of counting the first ballot results had generally not
been developed , this process t?o often took more time than had been contemplated.
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A key factor in th operation of caucus politics was that few of the people
who attended the local m etings did so without some organized encouragement. Groups urging their supporter to attend caucuses included th black
challenge , supporters of George Wallace , supporters of Georg McGovern ,
the women 's political caucus , and a number of elected officials and their
followers favoring delegates uncommitt d to any presidential candidate.
one ofthes groups wer monolithic, nor were they mutually exclusive. Yet
the activities and int ractions of the e groups provided the major inputs into
the dynamics of delegate selection. Winners at th caucus level were accused
of "packing" them , but attendance would have been even lower if organized
groups had not worked on turnout.
The success of the above groups in getting supporters to the caucuses was
largely dependent on their investment of time and energy in organization . A
coalition of elected officials favoring an uncommitted delegation had been
expect d to dominate the selection process at all levels , with th stronge t
opposition coming from supporters of George Wallace , who carried the stat
in 1968. However , turnouts at caucuses produced results in which elected
officials won only a part of the d I gation , and the Wallace people made a
strong showing in only one of the state 's eight congressional districts. With the
Democrats having only a slim chance of winning the presidency , the b nefits
for el cted officials of working on national politics did not seem high.
Moreover, the enthusiasm of el cted officials for the new sel ction process
was, at the most, limited, since one of its purposes was to open up the system
to other groups. The Wallacites seemed handicapped by their lack of knowledge about and attention to delegate sel ction in non-primary states. 21 By
contrast , McGovernites , the black chall nge, and the women's caucus expected to hen fit from the n w rules, invested a great deal of effort in turning
out voters, and achieved greater success in th caucuses than expected by the
news media or by elected officials.
All delegates to the Miami convention returning questionnaires attributed
the success of various groups to their efforts to promote participation at the
initial caucuses. Their interpretations of the events differed according to
succ ss of their group. A black female McGovern delegate elected from
Louisiana's Second Congressional District attributed the patterns in participation to "real grass roots campaigns [ that ] got the voters out ." A white male
Wallace delegate elected from the Sixth Congressional District attributed the
turnout to the fact that the "left wing and blacks ... were schooled and drilled
21
Billy Joe Camp , Wallace s national pr ess secretary , has ince said :" [ think the reason that
Wallace did not go more heavily into the non -primary stat es was because of a lack of knowledge
about the reform rules of the party on the part of the people dir ecting the campaign. There was a
feeling that ifwe got good votes out of the primaries , some oft he non -primary stat es would full into
line ." Ernest May and Janet Fraser (eds .), Campaign '72: Th e Ma,wg ers Sp eak (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press , 1973), p. 100.
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in tactics to disgust others with the whole situation. It was a conspiracy from
the beginning."
Although participants in the 1972 systems varied in their enthusiasm for
the new reforms, the vast majority had been supporters of Hubert Humphrey
in the 1968 general elections. Noticeable by their relative absence in the
selection process were the many Democrats that voted for ixon and Wallac e
in 1968.

Bargainin g and Negotiation
The caucus-convention system used in Louisiana proved to be a stimulus
to bargaining and negotiation . The exchange process began at the local caucuses on April 15. Slates of 15 candidates who pooled their support had a great
advantage in the caucuses over candidates who ran as individuals; it was
unlikely that one individual could bring as many supporters to his or her
caucus as could a coalition of 15 people. Many candidates ran as individuals,
but when full slates were formed - some in advance of the meetings , others
on the spot - they were usually successful. Many of the winning slates were
balanced according to age, sex, and, in mixed areas, race . Balanced slates were
achieved in part because some participants feared a challenge before the
Credentials Committee if blacks , women, and young people were not included, in part because blacks were threatening to boycott the process if not
given adequate representation , in part because many of the participants were
committed ideologically to the idea of balance , and in part because slates
including diverse groups were able to attract broad support.
Supporters of George Wallace were unable to coalesce with other groups.
Their lack of sympathy with racial balance and their image with other groups
handicapped efforts at joint slates. In areas where Wallace support was strong,
it frequently served to encourage cooperation between McGovern and nonMcGovern national Democrats , groups that often had trouble cooperating in
the absence of the "Wallace threat."
A similar pattern evolved in the congressional district conventions of May
13 and the election state-wide of the at-large delegates on May 20. It was
advantageous for candidates to run on slates, and groups other than the
Wallace supporters were hesitant to support slates that were racially and
sexually unbalanced for reasons both pragmatic and ideological.
The Louisiana delegation, which in the end was 43% black , 34% female,
and 27% under 30, was produced in large part by negotiated slatemaking.
one of the identinable groups - blacks , women , McGovernites, Wallacites,
and uncommitted candidates usually organized by elected officials - had
enough strength to elect delegates by themselves. Hence , their success in the
selection process depended to some extent on their ability to negotiate and
compromise. Women were very successful at early stages of the process but
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could not translate their early strength into a large number of delegates.
Women could not retain a unified bargaining front, because they were divided
by other loyalties as blacks, McGovernites , and by ties to elected officials. By
contrast, blacks became increasingly successful as the selection process progressed, because they retained cohesiveness in negotiations. McGovern supporters found it relatively easy to enter into coalitions, because they had been
committed from the start to substantial representation for blacks and women.
Elected officials were handicapped by a large number of previous commitments for delegate slots that inhibited compromise with other groups. At
several points in the selection process local McGovern leaders and representatives of elected officials attempted to put together compromise slates.
Despite the use of intermediaries in Washington, D.C., these negotiations
always broke down. As a result, the forces of McGovern and elected officials
often competed with each other for the support of black and female delegates.
Elected officials were not as successful in forming coalitions with blacks as they
might have been had they devoted more attention to delegate selection. The
night before the selection of at-large delegates in Baton Rouge, the Governor
failed to attend a scheduled appointment with the black delegates already
chosen. This lack of effort by the Governor ended any chances for a coalition
between the Governor and black delegates. In the end the Governor himself
was selected as a delegate, but the rest of his slate for the at-large positions,
consisting of the Democratic national committeeman, the state president of
the AFL-CIO, and the chairman of the Democratic state central committee,
was defeated by three black candidates supported by black and McGovern
delegates. 22
The Louisiana experience demonstrates that the balance in its delegation
was not simply the result of the new party rules , or what Etzioni refers to as
"utilitarian compliance. " 23 The reformed selection system established a context in which balanced representation could be achieved. Representation was
achieved in part because many of the participants in the process were national
Democrats in sympathy with the requirements of the reform commission. In
addition, the symbolism associated with the new rules was particularly attractive to blacks, women, and non-professional politicians. Since these groups
turned out in relatively heavy numbers for local caucuses , compliance with
22 The situation in Georgia contrasted sharply with that in Louisiana . The distribution of
McGovemites , blacks , and those tied to elected officials in the delegation after congressional
district conventions there was roughly the same as in Louisiana . But in Georgia , after the
Governor expended considerable effort meeting with black delegates , a working coalition was
formed between blacks and elected officials rather than between blacks and McGovernit es.
23 If representation was achieved simply because of the new rules , women would have been
as successful as blacks in winning seats , since the rules applying to the two groups were similar .
Yet blacks comprised 43% of the delegatfon and women 34%. In addition , if utilitarian complian ce
fully explained the changes in representation , levels of representation would have been uniform
throughout the state . Yet the three congressional districts including parts of metropolitan New
Orleans produced delegations that were 53% female and 47% black, while the delegations from
the other five districts were 35% black and 22% fema.le.
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national norms of representation occurred because most participants wanted
it to occur. Thus, representation was achieved by normative as well as utilitarian compliance, as well as by the dynamics of political bargaining and negotiation .
CONCLUSION
Southern states clearly did comply with the requirements
of the
McGovern-Fraser Commission in 1972 delegate selection. This adherence to
national party norms occurred despite the severity of the rules, the common
notion that national parties cannot control state parties , and the historic
position of the South as a dissenting region with the national Democratic
party.
The reasons for compliance are difficult to pinpoint. To some extent,
compliance was utilitarian, in that it resulted from the threat of sanctions . The
ultimate sanction was that delegations chosen in a manner considered improper would not be seated at the national convention. Even Democrats
disenchanted with the national party desired seating at the convention, so
they were obliged to adhere to the new guidelines.
In the caucus-convention state of Louisiana (and probably in a number of
other non-primary states ) participation in the delegate selection process was
dominated by national Democrats , supporters of George McGovern , and
blacks , all of whom sympathized to varying degrees with the new national
rules . As a result , compliance by those who participated was largely voluntary ,
and in some cases, such as the representation of blacks , the local state
delegations surpassed the minimal requirements of the national rules.
For some time , there have been two complementary trends in the development of the Democratic party in the South - its decreasing share of the
electorate in national elections and its "nationalization. " 24 The national norms
of the party have , to a large extent , been responsible for a drop in the loyalty of
many Southerners to the party. The decreasing size , however , has meant in
turn that the remaining core of Democrats are increasingly likely to sympathize with national norms . The delegate selection process in the South in
1972 probably exaggerated these trends , because of the importance of motivation for participation in non-primary systems. Yet the 1972 results were
consistent with these long-range trends.

24
Robert J. Steam e r, " Southern Disaffection with the National Democratic Party ," in
Sindler (ed .), Chang e in the Contemporary South , p. 150; Havard , Chan ging Politics of th e
South .
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TABLE l. Changes Required by Guidelines of Reform Commission
Violations in 1968 Plans
4-7
8-11
Stat es
0-3
27%
64%
0%
South ern
53%
0%
40%
Oth er

12-15
9%
8%

Source : Calculated from Commi ssion on Party Stru ctur e and De lega te Selection , The Party
Ref onn ed (Washin gton , D .C.: Democratic National Committ ee, 1972).

TABLE 2. Rates of Compliance with Reform Commission Guidelines

1971
1970
Stat es
27%
18%
South e rn
45%
Oth e r
5%
Source: Calculated from The Party Ref onn ed.

not in full
complian ce
18%
20%

1972
36%
30%

TABLE 3. Compliance and Southern Delegations to the 1972 Democratic National Convention

Crede ntials Committ ee
On Floo r
Unchallenged Delegations acDelegations Delegates
Delegates
Stat es
Delegations
cepted in toto
Accept ed
A ccept ed
Accepted
South e rn
9%
73%
98%
73%
98%
Oth e r
58%
75%
78%
95%
89%
Source: Calculated from Report of the Crede ntials Committ ee to the 1972 Democratic National
Convention; and Richard C. Bain and Judith H. Parri s, Convention Decisions and Voting
Records, 2nd ed . (Washington, D .C.: Th e Brookings In stitution , 1973).

TABLE 4. Black Presence in Southern Delegations

Stat es
Alabama
Arkansas
Florida
Geo rgia
Loui siana
Mississippi
orth Ca rolina
South Carolina
Te nnessee
Texas
Virginia

Total
37
53
59
59
50
44
74
42
66
121
66

1964
No.
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

%
0
0
0
6.7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Total
50
54
63
64
52
45
74
42
66
120
64

1968
No.
2
1
4
17
9
9
4
6
7
6
6

%
4
1.85
6.35
26.5
17.3
20
5.4
14.2
10.6
5
9 .3

Total
37
27
81
53
46
25
64
32
49
130
56

1972
No.
10
5
11
18
19
14
13
11
16
12
16

o/o

27
18.5
13.5
33.9
41.3
56
20.3
34.3
32.6
9.2
28.5
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TABLE 5. Presence of Women in Southern Delegations
Stat es
Alabama
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Louisiana
Mississippi
North Carolina
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia

Total
37
53
59
59
50

44
74
42
66
121
66

1964
N o.
2
9
26
7
11
2
11
l
7
8
7

%

5.4
16.9
44.07
11.8
22
4.5
14.8
2.38
10.6
6.6
10.6

Total
50
54
63
64
52
45
74
72
66
120
64

1968
No.
2
12
30
4
4
4
6
3
6
13
6

%

4.0
22.2
47.6
6.2
7.69
8.8
8. 1
7.1
9.09
10.8
9.38

Total
37
27
81
53
46
25
64
32
49
130
56

1972
No.
7
12
34
16
15
11
30
8
24
39
21

%

18. 9
44.4
41.9
30 .l
32 .6
44.0
46 .8
25.0
48.9
30
37 .5

